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MARIJUANA AND THE LAW: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO MARIJUANA LAWS IN LIGHT OF
THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MARIJUANA USE
In order to effectively evaluate the various constitutional challenges
which can be raised with respect to the federal and state laws prohibiting
the use and possession of marijuana,' it is important to understand the
nature of this drug, its historical and present usage, and the present laws
which are used to control it. No attempt will be made in this Comment
to resolve the current extensive debate over the harms and desirable uses of
marijuana except as is necessary in relation to the constitutional challenges.
I.
A.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Biological and PharmacologicalDescription
of Marijuana

In the United States the word "marijuana" is used to refer to the
preparation made from the flowering tops of the female hemp plant,
cannabis sativa.2 The hemp or cannabis grows wild and can be grown
in almost any climate and most soils. 3 While marijuana is sometimes

eaten or mixed with liquids, usage in this country is for the most part
confined to smoking dried, pulverized leaves in the form of cigarettes.4
The chemical responsible for the euphoric, intoxicating effects of marijuana
is presently thought to be tetrahydracannabinol. 5
The physiological effects of the smoking of marijuana are most authoritatively described in the standard pharmacological text, The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics:6
The subjective effects of the drug are exquisitely dependent not only
on the personality of the user but also on the dose, the route of administration, and the specific circumstances in which the drug is used.
The most common reaction is a development of a dreamy state of
altered consciousness in which ideas seem disconnected, uncontrollable,
and freely flowing. Ideas come in disrupted sequences, things long
forgotten are remembered, and others well known cannot be recalled.
Perception is disturbed, minutes seem to be hours, and seconds seem
1. See pp. 857-58 infra for a description of the federal and state laws prohibiting the use and possession of marijuana.
Since both "marijuana" and "marihuana" are acceptable spellings of the word,
for consistency the spelling "marijuana" will be used throughout this Comment except
for direct quotations.
2. Winick, Marihuana Use by Young People, in DRUG ADDICTION IN YOUTH 20
(E. Harms ed. 1965) ; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 213 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S

COMM'N].
(3d

NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC ADDICTION

See generally D.

MAURER

& V.

ed. 1967).

VOGEL,

3. Fort, Social and Legal Responses to Pleasure-Giving Drugs, in THE
UTOPIATES 212-13 (R. Blum ed. 1964).
4. Winick, supra note 2, at 21.
5. Fort, supra note 3, at 213; Murphy, The CannabisHabit: A Review of Recent
Psychiatric Literature, 15 U.N. BULL. ON NARCOTICS 3 (1963).
6. L. GOODMAN & A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS

(3d ed.
Published
by 1965).
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to be minutes: space may be broadened, and near objects may appear
far distant. When larger doses are used, extremely vivid hallucinations may be experienced; these are often pleasant, but their coloring,
sexual or otherwise, is more related to the user's personality than to
specific drug effects. There are often marked alterations of mood;
most characteristically there is a feeling of extreme well-being, exaltation, excitement, and inner joyousness (described as being "high").
Uncontrollable laughter and hilarity at minimal stimuli are common.
.This is often followed by a moody reverie, but occasionally the depressed mood may be the initial and predominant reaction. With the
larger doses, panic states and fear of death have been observed; the
body image may seem distorted; the head often feels swollen and the
extremities seem heavy. Illusions are not uncommon, and the feeling
of being a dual personality may occur. Even with the smaller doses,
behavior is impulsive and random ideas are quickly translated into
speech ;violent or aggressive behavior, however, is infrequent. When
the subject is alone, he is inclined to be quiet and drowsy; when ill
company, garrulousness and hilarity are the usual picture. Given the
properly predis p osed personality and high enough dosage, the clinical
picture may be that of a toxic psychosis.'
B.

Psychological Effects

The only authoritative and comprehensive study on marijuana in
the United States scientifically describing its psychological effects is the
"La Guardia Report," s based on a controlled study of regular marijuana
users in New York City in 1944. One of the major conclusions of the
La Guardia Report was that the psychological effects of moderate marijuana
smoking and moderate alcohol consumption are quite similar!' Physiologically, the effects of marijuana and alcohol are also quite similiar, as
the La Guardia Report concluded:
IN]either the ingestion of marihuana nor the
smoking of marihuana
cigarettes affects the basic outlook of the individual except in a very
few instances and to a very slight degree .... In other words reactions
which are natively alien to the individual cannot be induced by the
ingestion or smoking of the drug.'
As with alcohol, the external symptoms vary with the personality of
the user. 1
7. Id. at 300.
8. MAYOR'S COMMITTEE ON MARIJUANA, THE MARIJUANA PROBLEM IN THE
CITY'oF NEw YORK (1944). This report, better known as the "La Guardia Report,"
is presently out of print but significant portions of it are reprinted in THE MARIJUANA
PAPERS 233-360 (D. Solomon ed. 1966). References will be to that source [hereinafter
cited as La Guardia Report, THE MARIJUANA PAPERS].

9. La Guardia Report,

THE MARIJUANA

PAPERS,

supra note 8, at 282-83; see

R. Blum, Mind-Altering Drugs and Dangerous Behavior: Dangerous Drugs, in
PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION ON

LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND

TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE

at 21.

ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

22 (1967) ; Murphy, supra note 5,

With larger doses of marijuana the similarity to the effects of alcohol con-

sumption differ. See L.

GOODMAN

& A.

GILMAN,

supra note 6, at 300.

10. La Guardia Report, THE MARIJUANA PAPERS, supra note 8, at 334.
11. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., DRUG ABUSE AND LAw ENFORCEMENT 14 (submitted to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
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Other effects of marijuana use, however, are not similar to alcohol.
The long-term psychological effects of marijuana use, unlike those of
alcohol, are not neurosis or psychotic illness.' 2 Also, for most people the
use of marijuana does not result in socially aggressive activity, which
3
frequently does result from the use of alcohol.'
There do not appear to be any long-term effects from the use of marijuana except perhaps a form of generalized fatigue.14 The major distinction between marijuana and "hard narcotics" is that marijuana is not
addictive, but like tobacco, is capable of inducing habitual use.' 5 In fact,
it appears easier to stop smoking marijuana than it does to stop smoking
tobacco.' 6 Being nonaddictive, marijuana use does not result in physical
dependence' 7 or tolerance.' 8 In fact, the experienced marijuana user frequently uses less marijuana to achieve a desired euphoric state than does
the novice. 19
C.

History of Usage in the United States

Prior to the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act20 in 1937 marijuana

was used only to a negligible extent by the medical profession 21 as a treatment for coughing, tuberculosis, rheumatism, asthma, and venereal disease. 22 The 1937 Act and subsequent regulations have eliminated almost
23
all medical use of marijuana.
At the time of the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, marijuana was
used almost exclusively by lower classes and minority groups. 24 In various
Justice 1967). See also Becker, Marihuana: A Sociological Overview, in THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 36-37 (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
12. Murphy, supra note 5, at 19. Approximately 20 percent of the people in state
mental hospitals are there because of alcoholic brain disease. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

JUSTICE, TASK

Or

FORCE

REPORT:

DRUNKENNESS 121 (1967).

13. Murphy, supra note 5, at 16.
14. Fort, supra note 3, at 213; Winick, supra note 2, at 23; cf. ARTHUR D. LITTLE,
INC., supra note 11, at 15-16.
15. WHITE HOUSE

CONFERENCE

ON

NARCOTIC

[hereinafter cited as WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE].
MARIJUANA PAPERS,

supra note 8, at 345-47.

AND DRUG

ABUSE 277 (1963)

See also La Guardia Report, THE

16. Pescor, The Problem of Drug Addiction, 43 J. CRIM. L. 473 (1952).
17. Fort, supra note 3, at 207; Winick, supra note 2, at 23; WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 286.
Marijuana may, however, be one of a variety of drugs used in the "multihabituation" pattern, where a person takes many different drugs and appears dependent, but not on any one of them. R. Blum, supra note 9, at 24.
18. See authorities cited note 17 supra. Tolerance has been defined as:
[A] fundamental survival mechanism which permits body cells to be exposed continuously to toxic substances without evoking possibly dangerous responses. This
is manifested by the phenomenon that successive doses of the same amount of
drugs produce lesser effects and that, conversely, larger and larger doses are
necessary to achieve the effects of the first dose.
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 277.
19. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., supra note 11, at 15.
20. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 4741-46, 4751-57.
21. S. REP. No. 900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
22. A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 225 (1965).
23. Winick, supra note 2, at 21.
La Guardia
Report,
THEWidger
MARIJUANA
supra
note 8, 1968
at 259; cf. A.
Published24.
by Villanova
University
Charles
School ofPAPERS,
Law Digital
Repository,
LINDESMITH, stpra note 22, at 226.
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forms marijuana has been used by man as a euphorant for almost 5000
25
years.
11.

CURRENT USAGE AND PROBLEMS

A.

Extent of Usage

While there does not appear to be any reliable evidence as to the exact
extent of marijuana usage today,'2 there does appear to be general agreement that usage in the United States is increasing and spreading across
a broader base of the population.27 It is difficult to correlate extent of
usage with marijuana arrests for many reasons. First, arrests are often
more closely related to increases in police activity rather than an actual
increase in the usage,28 and these arrests tend to be concentrated among
the lower class groups.2 9 Secondly, because the marijuana user is under
less compulsion to buy the drug than a heroin addict he can buy larger
quantities at lower prices, need not engage in criminal activity to support
his habit, and is less likely to come in contact with organized crime.-"
Present surveys indicate that as much as 20 percent of the students at
some colleges have some experience with marijuana, 31 and a total of be-

tween two and four million Americans have tried the drug.8 2 Although
these figures are subject to considerable skepticism,3 3 there does appear to
be general agreement that only a small percentage of the students ever use
marijuana more than a few times3 4 - the common usage being a form of
experimentation. The consensus of opinion among writers in the area
indicates that present usage of marijuana has shifted from minority groups
such as Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, urban poor, and jazz musicians
to college students, young professionals, and artists throughout the country,
predominantly in the 18- to 30-year-old age group.35
Because of the economics of marijuana traffic - relatively large bulk
andi low profits - the distribution is almost entirely in the hands of
amateurs, with almost no participation by organized crime.-" The cost
of marijuana varies with the quantity, proximity to the Mexican border,
and season of the year.

A pound sells for $85 to $125 while individual

37
cigarettes cost about 50 cents apiece.

25. A. LINDISMITH, supra note 22, at 225.
26. Winick, supra note 2, at 19; PRESIDENT'S

COMM'N,

27. R. Blum, supra note 9, at 24; PRESIDENT'S
ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., supra note 11, at 6.
28. Winick, supra note 2, at 19.
29. R. Blum, supra note 9, at 24.
30. Winick, supra note 2, at 19.

31. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1968, at 22, col. 3;

supra note 2, at 213.

COMm'N,

ARTHUR

D.

supra note 2, at 213;

LITTLE, INC.,

supra note 11,

at 16.
32. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1968, at 22, col. 3; cf. Fort, Social Problems of Drug
Usc and Drug Policies, 56 CALIF. L. Rev. 17, 22 n.29 (1968).
33. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 213.

34. R. Blum, supra note 9, at 24;

ARTHUR

D.

LITTLE, INC.,

supra note 11, at 16.

35. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1968, at 22, col. 3; R. Blum, supra note 9, at 24; ARTHUR
D. LITTLE, INC., supra note 11, at 6; NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1967, at 46; TIME, July 7,
1967, at 19.
36. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., supra note 11, at 17, G-2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,
1968, at 22, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1968, at 30, col. 2.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
37. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., supra note 11, at G-2.

4

Dichter: Marijuana and the Law: The Constitutional Challenges to Marijuana

SUMMER

1968]

COMMENTS

B.

Sociological Harms

One of the major sociological harms attributed to marijuana is that
3
marijuana is a "stepping stone" to "hard narcotics," primarily heroin. 1
While law enforcement agencies frequently speak in terms of the percentage
of heroin addicts who first smoked marijuana, the more relevant statistic
in determining the extent of progression from marijuana to "hard narcotics" is what percentage of persons who smoke marijuana eventually go
on to use heroin. This figure is in fact quite low. 3 9 When this progression
from marijuana to "hard narcotics" does occur it does not stem from anything intrinsic to marijuana, but is due to particular social aspects of its
use.4 ° In America today the social and legal stigmas attached to both
heroin and marijuana throw the users together and the marijuana users
may develop favorable attitudes toward heroin use. Thus, the person
who becomes a regular marijuana smoker can be on his way to heroin
addiction. 41 Sociologists have shown that concomitant with learning to
enjoy marijuana, the user learns new attitudes toward the use of drugs,
adopts the unconventional views of the deviate group of users, and alienates
himself from his older, more conventional associates and their morality.42
It is obvious that this process would leave a person more disposed to experiment with heroin. Thus, instead of helping to lessen the real problem heroin use - the present laws and social attitudes are two of the primary
factors contributing to the progression from marijuana to heroin.
A second social harm frequently attributed to marijuana is the relationship between marijuana use and other crimes. It is alleged that marijuana use leads to the commission of violent crimes while under the
influence of marijuana and the general criminal personality of the marijuana
user leads to nonviolent crimes such as property crimes. 43 Both parts of
this claim lack any substantiating evidence. The La Guardia Report found
that "[m]arijuana is not the determining factor in the commission of
major crimes." 44 Subsequent studies have in fact shown a negative correlation between crime and the use of marijuana. 45 Arrest statistics indicating
that marijuana users have criminal records and that the first offense of
many criminals is marijuana possession or use, reflect at most the personality and environmental characteristics which may lead to marijuana
38. R. Blum, supra note 9, at 24; BUREAU or NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT, THE
(1965) ; H. ANSLINGER & W. TOMPKINS, THE TRAFFIC IN

NARCOTIC PROBLEM 12
NARCOTICS 20 (1953).

39. Winick, supra note 2, at 13, 28-30; Chein & Rosenfeld, Juvenile Narcotics
Use, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 52 (1957).
40. R. Blum, supra note 9, at 53; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 225.
41. See E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS: DVIANT BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC
POLICY 175 (1965) ; Fort, Heroin Addiction Among Young Men, in NARCOTIC ADDICTION

78-79 (J. O'Donnell & J. Ball eds. 1966).

42. Becker, supra note 11, at 46-54.
43. See S. REP. No. 900, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) ; H.R. REP. No. 792, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
44. La Guardia Report, THE MARIJUANA PAPERS, supra note 8, at 260.

45. byMcGlothlin,
Cannabis:
A Reference,
in of
THE
PAPERS
Published
Villanova University
Charles
Widger School
Law MARIJUANA
Digital Repository,
1968 401, 412
(D. Solomon ed. 1966) ; Murphy, supra note 5, at 6.
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smoking; but marijuana smoking has not been established as a source of
other antisocial acts which sometimes appear on the user's police record.46
Since marijuana use is nonaddictive and the cost of supporting a
marijuana "habit" is relatively low, there is no need for a marijuana user
to commit property crimes to support his "habit" as is the case with the
heroin addict. 47 Any connection that exists between marijuana users and
the criminal society is primarily a result of the laws making marijuana use
and possession illegal, thus requiring the marijuana user to associate with
criminals who supply and sell marijuana. 4 Those marijuana users who
are convicted of marijuana use and serve time in penal institutions naturally come into close contact with other criminals, which may contribute
to the possibility of future criminal activity.
In order to effectively evaluate both of the sociological harms attributed
to marijuana use, we must consider the effect that permitting the use of
marijuana would have on the acknowledged evils - crime and heroin
addiction. The crucial questions then become whether permitting the use
of marijuana will increase the number of people who become heroin addicts
or who commit other crimes. While any attempt to answer these questions would involve conjecture, the preceding discussion raises strong arguments in favor of the conclusion that permitting the use of marijuana
would not aggravate the real problems - heroin addiction and other
crime - and actually might help reduce them.
Another major objection to legalizing the use of marijuana is the
possible harm of marijuana use to the user himself. To evaluate this con-

tention we must compare the effects of marijuana with other mild intoxicants, the use of which are currently permitted - alcohol and tobacco.
As discussed earlier, the reasons for smoking marijuana and its immediate
psychological effects are quite similar to those for consuming alcohol. 41,
Smoking marijuana produces relatively harmless physical effects, although
immoderate use of the more concentrated products of the hemp plant does
produce some deleterious effects. These effects, however, are not conspicuous among marijuana users in the United States because of the relatively small quantity of the drug they ingest through smoking and the
poor quality of marijuana ordinarily available in this country) ° Chronic
alcoholism, on the other hand, frequently results in psychotic conditions
and diseases. 51 The smoking of tobacco is more habit-forming than smok2
ing marijuana and creates a much greater risk of physical harmY
46. E. SCHUR, supra note 41, at 125.

47. Winick, supra note 2, at 19.
48. See Clausen, Social and Psychological Factors in Narcotics Addiction, 22
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 34, 41 (1957) ; Finestone, Narcotics and Criminality, 22 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 69, 72 (1957).

49. See p. 852 supra.
50. A. LINDFSMITH, supra note 22, at 223. See also ARTHUR D. LITTL, INC.,
supra note 11, at 15-16.
51. A. LINDESMITIH, supra note 22, at 223.
52. A causative relationship has been found to exist between the use of nicotine
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
and hundreds of thousands of deaths and disabilities each year in the United States
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The question remains, as will be discussed below, whether the fact
that marijuana is potentially harmful to its user, even if proven, would
alone be sufficient to justify the prohibition of its use and or possession.
AIother question relating to the comparison between marijuana and other
intoxicants is whether the use of marijuana must be permitted if it is
proven that the use of alcohol or tobacco is potentially more harmful to
the user than marijuana use.
III.

PRESENT

CONTROLS OVER THE USE AND

POSSESSION

OF MARIJUANA

Control of marijuana is not related to abuse as is the case with
alcohol. 53 Federal and state laws prohibit possession of marijuana and
make violation a felony.5 4 In addition, all states also prohibit the use of
marijuana, but this crime frequently carries a lesser penalty.''
A. Federal Laws
The basic federal law prohibiting possession of marijuana is the
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.50 The Tax Act itself does not prohibit marijuana possession. However, proof of possession of marijuana without
the tax stamps attached is sufficient evidence upon which to predicate a
conviction of a violation of the Act. 7 The importation of marijuana is
also prohibited by the Export-Import Actj s and possession of marijuana
raises a presumption of illegal importation.5 9 Thus, under federal law,
possession of marijuana can be prosecuted either under the Export-Import
Act, which provides a minimum mandatory 5-year prison sentence, or
under the Marihuana Tax Act which does not carry with it the implications of illegal importation and provides a nonmandatory 2- to 10-year
prison sentence for the first offense. Since the possession of marijuana is
punishable under either statute, choice of charge rests with the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, the agency of the Treasury Department responsible
for enforcing the federal marijuana laws.
B.

State Laws

Every state prohibits the possession of marijuana without medical
prescription. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act 60 has been enacted in all
from lung cancer, heart disease, hypertension, emphysema, and bronchitis. See UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL (1964).

53. For example, typical state laws punish driving of a vehicle or being found in
any public place under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.
54. See W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1967) for a comparison
of the various state laws prohibiting the possession of marijuana.

55. Id.

56. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4741-46, 4751-57.
57. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4753-55.

58. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
59. Id.

60. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act is reprinted in W. ELDRIDGE, supra note 54,

at 161-75.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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states except California and Pennsylvania, 6 and both of these states have
statutes similar to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. 62 The Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act prohibits, inter alia, the manufacture, possession, or
sale of any narcotic drug, with certain exceptions.68 As defined in the Act
64
narcotic drugs include marijuana.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL

CHALLENGES TO THE

MARIJUANA LAWS
The constitutional arguments against the marijuana laws can be
grouped into two general categories. The first is comprised of challenges
to the right of the government to regulate the use of marijuana at all. The
constitutional bases for such a challenge are the rights of privacy, fundamental peripheral rights, and substantive due process. In addition, the
first amendment free exercise of religion guarantee could provide a constitutional protection for those who use marijuana in connection with their
religious practice.
The second general category includes arguments against the manner
in which marijuana is presently controlled and the severity of the penalties
associated with these laws. Under this category, equal protection and
due process arguments can be raised in regard to the classification of
marijuana with "hard narcotics" and the difference between the legal
treatment of marijuana and other intoxicants such as alcohol and tobacco.
In this category we can also include the arguments under the eighth
amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment with respect to
the excessiveness of the punishment for the violation of the marijuana
laws. A final challenge to the marijuana laws relates to the federal laws
which provide that anyone dealing in marijuana must register, obtain
special forms from the government to accompany all transfers, and file
a special tax return. The privilege against self-incrimination, provided for
by the fifth amendment, may provide a significant constitutional challenge
to these provisions.
A.
1.

The Right of the Government to Regulate the
Use of Marijuana

Freedom of Religion

The guarantee of the right of free exercise of religion provided for
by the first amendment of the Constitutionl5 would, of course, only preclude the prohibition of the use of marijuana for religious purposes; however, conceivably, the protection could extend to all those claiming to use
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id.
63. UNIFORM

NARCOTIc DRUG ACT

§ 2.

UNIFORM NARCOTIc DRUG ACT § 1 (14).
65. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof ......
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11

64.
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marijuana in an attempt to acheive a "religious experience." 6 The application of the free exercise guarantee presents many intricate problems
including the determination of what in fact constitutes a religion and the
balancing of the state's interest against the importance of the practice to
the religion and the extent to which the government regulation interferes
with the religion. It would be impossible in a comment of this nature to
fully develop all of the complex issues raised by the application of the
freedom of religion clause to the use of marijuana 7 The basic issues,
however, will be presented and discussed in light of the recent cases which
have attempted to decide these issues.
In 1964 these issues were, for the first time, fully discussed with
respect to the use of peyote 68 in People v. Woody. 6 9 The Supreme Court
of California held that a California statute prohibiting the possession of
peyote was unconstitutional as applied to members of the Native American
Church, a religious organization of American Indians.70 In attempting
to balance the importance of a particular practice to the religion against
the importance of the state's interest and against the impact of a religious
exemption on that interest, the court found that peyote plays a central
role in the ceremony and practice of the Native American Church and that
to apply the statute to members of that sect would be to "remove the
theological heart" of their religion. 7 ' However, the court made it clear
that the religious practice must be in good faith and that this is a question
of fact which must be determined by the trial court.72 Therefore, the court
remanded a case the same day in which the free exercise of religion
guarantee was raised by one who was not a member of the Native Ameri73
can Church.
Once it is established that marijuana use is in fact protected by the
first amendment, then, as with any invasion of a first amendment right,
the state must show a compelling, not merely a reasonable, interest in
abridging this right. 74 In stating this basic principle the Supreme Court
asserted, "[i]t is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship
to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive con66. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. Riv. 1381, 1423-31
(1967) ; Watts, Psychedelics and Religious Experience, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 74 (1968).
67. For a fuller discussion of the applicability of the freedom of religion guarantee to the use of marijuana see Finer, Psychcdelics and Religious Freedom, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 667 (1968) ; Comment, Free Exercise: Religion Goes to "Pot," 56
CALIF. L. Rnv. 100 (1968).
68. Peyote is the hallucinogenic substance obtained from the button-shaped growth
of a cactus plant found growing wild in the arrid regions of Mexico. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, supra note 2, at 215. See also Note, Hallucinogens, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 521,
524-25 (1968).
69. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), noted in 17 STAN.
L. Rxv. 494 (1965) and 6 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 233 (1965).
70. 61 Cal. 2d at 727-28, 394 P.2d at 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
71. Id. at 726-27, 394 P.2d at 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
72. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
73. In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964).
74. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963). See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) ; Thomas v.
Collins,by323
U.S. 516,
Published
Villanova
University
Charles; Widger
of Law Digital
538 (1945)
BridgesSchool
v. California,
314Repository,
U.S. 252,1968
261 (1941).
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stitutional area, '[o]uly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "15 The requisites for
establishing a compelling state interest will be discussed below with respect
to the other constitutional challenges which also require this showing
76
of a compelling state interest.
Apparently ignoring the compelling interest test, as it was applied in
W/oodv, the North Carolina supreme court, in State v. Bullard,77 held
that the first amendment did not protect the use of drugs which produced
hallucinatory symptoms when the use would constitute a threat to public
safety, morals, peace, and order.7 8 Distinguishing between the right of
freedom of religious belief and the right to act pursuant to that belief, the
North Carolina court held that regardless of the defendant's sincerity in
his religious belief, the first amendment did not protect the use of peyote
and marijuana in connection with his religion, even if the use of these
drugs was necessary to the religion.7 9 In affirming the conviction of Dr.
Timothy Leary for possession of marijuana, the Fifth Circuit applied the
compelling interest test but found that the government did in fact have a
compelling interest in prohibiting the use of marijuana even for religious
purposes.8 0 Dr. Leary was sentenced to 30 years in prison and fined
$40,000 for having in his possession less than one-half of an ounce of
marijuana. 8 ' The court attempted to distinguish the Woody case on
the question of whether the drug was essential to the religion.8 2 In a
footnote the court in Leary also drew a distinction between "the use of
peyote in the limited bona fide religious ceremonies of the relatively small,
unknown Native American Church" and "the private and personal use of
83
marihuana by any person who claims he is using it as a religious practice.
The constitutional distinction between the use of a drug as part of a
ceremony of a recognized organized church and the use of a drug to achieve
personal religious experience is highly questionable in light of the United
States Supreme Court's holding that belonging to an organized church or
belief in a supreme being is not necessarily a prerequisite to the application of a guarantee of freedom of religion.8 4 The basic issue of whether
the use of psychedelic drugs belongs within the protection of freedom of
75. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
76. See pp. 867-68 infra.
77. 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), noted in 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 369 (1967)
and 19 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 377 (1966).
78. 267 N.C. at 603, 148 S.E.2d at 568-69.
79. Id. at 604, 148 S.E.2d at 569.
80. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S.Ct.
2058 (1968) (No. 1365, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 65, 1968 Term).
81. 383 F.2d at 854. Dr. Leary was convicted of transportation, facilitation of
transportation, and concealment of marijuana after importation, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 176a, and of transportation and concealment of marijuana by defendants as
transferees required to pay the transfer tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code,
in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (2).
82. 383 F.2d at 861.
83. Id. at 861 n.ll.
84. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). See also United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) ; United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 363 (7th
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
Cir. 1965).
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religion is one of the most complicated and controversial issues surrounding the free exercise clause. Professor Donald Giannella, in his extensive
article on the religious liberty guarantee,8 5 has asserted that the use of
psychedelic drugs is not deserving of status as a free exercise claim under
the first amendment, at least not for claimants who practice what he terms
"modern nontheistic religions." 86 Professor Joel J. Finer, attorney for Dr.
Leary, has presented extensive argument in an attempt to refute the position taken by Professor Giannella. 87 The one point that is clear from this
debate is that the application of the free exercise guarantee of the first
amendment to the use of psychedelic drugs presents an extremely complex
philosophical question which eventually will have to be resolved by the
United States Supreme Court.88
2.

The Right of Privacy

The right of privacy is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution or
Bill of Rights, but Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 9 reasoned that the right of privacy is found by
looking to the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights hav[ing] penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance." 90 The Court in Griswold held that the marital relationship lies within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees and this right of privacy presents a substantive
bar to a criminal statute which prohibits the use of birth control devices. 91
While Griswold was the first Supreme Court case to deal with the
substantive right of privacy, earlier Supreme Court cases have recognized
the existence of this right. 92 Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his famous dissent
in Olmstead v. United States, 93 spoke historically of the right of privacy
as "the right to be let alone":
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by
94
civilized men.
85. Giannella, supra note 66.
86. Id. at 1426-27.
87. Finer, supra note 67.
88. In granting certiorari in Leary v. United States the Supreme Court specifically
limited the scope of the appeal to the fifth amendment questions of self-incrimination
and due process. 88 S. Ct. 2058 (1968).
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Id. at 484. Zones of privacy are created by the penumbras of the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id.
91. Id. at 485.
92. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
93. 277 U.S. at 471.
Published
94. by
Id.Villanova
at 478. University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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The zone of privacy discussed in Griswold is conceptually quite
different from the traditional fourth and fifth amendment rights of privacy.
In effect, the fourth and fifth amendments are guarantees of security setting limits upon certain specified governmental activities rather than
protecting any particular activities of the people. Under the fourth amendment the concern is with the means of enforcement, e.g., searches, while
the right of privacy recognized in Griswold precludes any enforcement,
regardless of the means used.
In prior cases some justices have recognized substantive rights of
privacy related to first amendment rights such as the freedoms of association,915 speech, 96 and belief.07 The Court in Griswold did not attempt to
relate the zone of privacy to any of the accepted freedoms or rights but
spoke of the privacy surrounding the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms."98 While the zone of privacy surrounding the marital bedroom may
be quite narrow, the Griswold case does recognize the existence of zones
of privacy not related to any of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Under the first amendment, the freedom of speech has been expanded
beyond verbal expression99 to include both graphical expression' 0 0 and
physical expression. 101 There does not appear to be any reason why these
forms of expression should not be surrounded by zones of privacy as is
the freedom of association. Since the use of marijuana, even for the mere
enjoyment of the experience, is a form of expression dealing solely with
the mind, a strong argument can be made for bringing this extremely
private form of expression within the ambit of the zone of privacy sur10 2
rounding the freedom of expression.
The right of privacy was raised as a constitutional challenge to the
Massachusetts marijuana laws in Commonwealth v. Leis;'0 3 however, the
court dismissed the challenge, confusing somewhat the substantive right of
privacy and the freedom from illegal searches. The argument was dismissed summarily, the court stating:
FTlhe citizen's right to privacy is not to be protected by excluding
otherwise criminal conduct from regulation so long as it is confined to
the home, but rather by a strict adherence to the statutory and consti95. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
96. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
97. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
98. 381 U.S. at 485.
99. E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Wollain v. City of Palm
Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
100. E.g., In re Klor. 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966)
People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1024 (1968).
101. E.g., Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
102. See Comment, The California Marijuana Possession Statute: An Infringement on the Right of Privacy or Other Peripheral ConstitutionalRights?, 19 HASTINGS
L.J. 758 (1968).
103. Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5 (Suffolk Superior Ct., Mass., entered Dec.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
1967) (findings, rulings and order on defendants' motions to dismiss).
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tutional provisions relating to the power of4 the police to arrest and
search and of the courts to issue warrants."
In addition to the argument that the right of privacy provides a direct
substantive bar to marijuana statutes, the enforcement of these statutes
also raises possible constitutional questions. Laws prohibiting the use and
possession of marijuana, being "crimes without victims,"' 5 require special
police techniques for their enforcement. Justice Douglas recognized one
aspect of this problem when he asked in Griswold :106 "Would we allow
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives?" With marijuana we are not primarily
concerned with the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" but there are
enforcement problems created by the fact that marijuana is rarely used
10 7
in public.
The use of marijuana, by its very nature covert and personal, makes
the discovery of information concerning these crimes very difficult. The
scarcity of complaints to bring these offenses to the attention of authorities
makes it necessary for the police to actively seek out offenses.10 8 Among
the medical and social agencies that deal with drug dependent persons, the
code of good faith with their clients forbids giving any information to enforcement officials. In the subculture in which the use of marijuana takes
place, people are reluctant to give information to law enforcement personnel
because of a general distrust of the police and a strong feeling that the
marijuana laws are unjustified.
Law enforcement officials are left in the position of having to seek out
information necessary for effective enforcement by the use of undercover
investigation and informants. 10 9 Both of these techniques present serious
threats to the guarantee of a right of privacy. The enforcement of the
marijuana laws frequently comes in direct conflict with the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures - a well-established area of privacy. Where the police are unable to obtain sufficient
evidence to meet the constitutional standards for a reasonable search and
seizure, the police often make exploratory searches and invalid arrests,
knowing full well that the only possible sanction imposed against them
will be the loss of a conviction as the result of the exclusionary rule." 0
As a result, police make use of their authority to harass those they con104. Id. at 25.
105. For an excellent discussion of the use of term "crimes without victims" and
its application to the marijuana laws see E. SCHUR, supra, note 41.
106. 381 U.S. at 485.
107. Becker, supra note 11, at 50-54.
108. J. SKOLNICK, COERCION TO VIRTUE: A SOCIOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 65 (submitted to the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967).
109. Id. See generally H. ANSLINGER, THE PROTECTORS (1964).
110. J.Skolnick, supra note 108, at 59. See also Article, Effects of Mapp v. Ohio
on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL
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sider to be petty offenders because they cannot gain sufficient evidence to
convict them in court."'
Enforcement of the marijuana laws also causes another serious
problem, although perhaps not one of constitutional proportions. Enforcement of these laws is especially susceptible to discrimination against
those in the lower socioeconomic classes. The same effect has been pointed
out by authorities analyzing the enforcement of the prohibition laws."1
The harsh penalties and minimum mandatory sentences associated with
the marijuana laws also frequently result in their arbitrary enforcement,"'
since the only alternatives open to the police, prosecutors, and the courts
are to impose a sentence they feel unjustified or impose no punishment at
all. Arbitrary enforcement also results from the lack of citizen complaints
to direct the efforts of the law enforcement authorities. Without the complaints the police are not directed by the moral concern of the citizens.
11 4
but by their own moral standards.
3.

Fundamental Personal Rights

The Supreme Court opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut",5 is also
authority for the existence of broad unnamed peripheral rights existing
within the Bill of Rights.11 6 That fundamental constitutional rights not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution do exist is not a new concept.
Earlier Supreme Court cases recognized rights such as the freedom of
inquiry,1 17 freedom of thought, 118 and freedom to teach," 9 and the
Griswold Court designated these as "peripheral rights."' 12 0 These rights
were considered essential because "without those peripheral rights the
'121
specific rights would be less secure."
Two California cases have followed the reasoning in Griswold; one
held that the possession of obscene literature is protected by the first
amendment under the freedom of expression, 22 and the other upheld the
right of a high school teacher to wear a beard without losing his job.' 2 '
In both cases the court held that this conduct, while not speech, is expression falling within the periphery of the first amendment.12 4 The United
States Supreme Court in Kent v. Dulles125 recognized the existence of
111. See authorities cited in note 110 supra.
112. See, e.g., E. SCHUR, supra note 41, at 55.
113. A. LIND&SMITH, supra note 22, at 90.
114. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 108, at 65.
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. Id. at 482-83.
117. E.g., Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
118. See Wieman v. Updegroft, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
119. Id. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
120. 381 U.S. at 483.
121. Id. at 482-83.
122. In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966).
123. Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr.
520 (1967).
124. 64 Cal. 2d at 821, 415 P.2d at 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906; 250 Cal. App. 2d at 199,
5,Cal. Rptr. at 527.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
125. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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these peripheral fundamental rights by holding that "the right of exit
[travel from the country] is a personal right included within the word
'liberty' as used in the fifth amendment."' 126 Under this reasoning, the
Court held that passports could not be constitutionally withheld from citizens solely because there are communists. 27 In discussing the "liberty"
of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process under the fifth
amendment, the Court in Kent stated that "[travel] may be as close to the
heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads."' 28
It would appear to follow logically that the choice of what the user smokes
or ingests should also be brought within the scope of these fundamental
29
peripheral rights.'
The Supreme Court has also recognized the existence of fundamental
peripheral rights within the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of liberty.
In holding unconstitutional a Nebraska statute which prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students below the eighth grade, the Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska130 stated:
[W]ithout doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendnient] denoted not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the

right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, .

.

. and generally to enjoy those

privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly
3
pursuit of happiness by free men.' '
The Court made it clear that this list of personal rights was not meant to
be all-inclusive and there was no requirement that the privilege claimed
3 2be "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.'
The existence of fundamental personal rights was raised as a defense
in the case of Commonwealth v. Leis. 13 3

Judge Tauro, in the Leis case.

held with respect to the existence of a fundamental right of marijuana use:
[A] n examination of those cases cited by the defendants indicates that
only those rights are to be considered as fundamental whose continuation is essential to ordered liberty. In other words, fundamental rights
are those without which democratic society would cease to exist.
Furthermore, those rights which are recognized as fundamental are
also, in many instances, closely related to some commonly acknowledged moral or
legal duty and not merely to a hedonistic seeking
34
after pleasure.1
126. Id. at 129.
127. Id. at 130.
128. Id. at 126.

129. See Comment, The CaliforniaMarijuana PossessionStatute: An Infringement
on the Righf of Privacy or Other PeripheralConstitutional Rights?, 19 HASTINGS L.J.
758, 769 (1968).
130. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
131. Id. at 399.
132. Id.
133. Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5 (Suffolk Superior Ct., Mass., entered Dec.
1967) (findings, rulings and order on defendants' motions to dismiss).
Published134.
by Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
Id. at 5-6.
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It is difficult to see how the wearing of a beard or the possessing of
obscene photographs are essential to ordered liberty or necessary to the
existence of a democratic society; yet, the California supreme court held
that both of these activities do fall within the zone of fundamental constitutional rights. 135 This would seem to indicate that a fundamental personal
right need not be "essential to ordered liberty" in order to exist.
4.

Substantive Due Proccss

A further possible bar to the government regulation of the use and
possession of marijuana is a newly emerging concept of "substantive due
process."' 3 6 Under one possible interpretation of Robinson v. California,',
which held that criminal punishment for narcotics addiction violates the
eighth amendment, it can be argued that the eighth amendment bar against
cruel and unusual punishment precludes any government regulation in this
area. 13 8 The substantive due process concept is that there are types of
conduct for which criminal sanctions cannot be imposed without violating
standards of decency even though the state may have a legitimate interest
13 9
Under this
in suppressing and correcting a socially harmful condition.
concept the traditional eighth amendment standards concerning the extent
40
is not applied, but the
or type of punishment imposed for the offense
question is whether any criminal punishment at all can be applied to this
offense. The requirement of substantive due process was used recently
by New York and Massachusetts courts in holding unconstitutional those
141
states' vagrancy statutes.
The specific holding in Robinson would not, of course, be directly
applicable to marijuana cases since Robinson was concerned with one who
42
Robinson and later cases holding
was addicted to the use of narcotics.'

143
and vagrancy 144 have
unconstitutional laws against chronic alcoholism

spoken in terms of "status crimes." The United States Supreme Court, in
135. See p. 864 supra.
136. For an excellent discussion of the development of the concept of substantive
due process and its application see Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,
77 HARV. L. Rev. 1071 (1964).
137. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
138. See Packer, supra note 136, at 1071; Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishinent Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 645-55 (1966).
139. See Note, supra note 138, at 655.
140. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
231 N.E.2d 201 (1967) ; Fenster v.
Mass.
141. Alegata v. CommonwealthLeary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967). For a discussion of
these cases with respect to the concept of substantive due process see 13 VILL. L. Rnv.
658 (1968).
142. The Supreme Court in Robinson held:
[A] state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted [with the illness of being a
narcotic addict] as a criminal . . . inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .Even one day in prison would be
cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold.
370 U.S. at 667.
143. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Easter v. District of
Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But see Powell v. Texas, 88 S. Ct. 2145
(1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
144. See cases cited note 141 supra.
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Powell v. Texas, 14 5 upheld the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for being in
public while drunk on a particular occasion.1 46 In distinguishing Robinson,
the Court stated:
The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status, as
California did in Robinson; nor has it attempted to regulate appellant's behavior in the privacy of his own home. Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for public behavior which
may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for appellant
and for members of the general public, and which offends the moral
and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the community. 14
Even if Robinson were extended to include those acts necessarily
incident to the status of being a narcotics addict such as use and possession,
it still does not appear that this would present a bar to government prohibition of the use and possession of marijuana since, as discussed earlier,
the use of marijuana does not involve a "status.' u 48
5.

State Interests vs. Fundamental Constitutional Rights

Once it is established that the use of marijuana is protected by one of
the fundamental constitutional rights - freedom of religion, right to
privacy, or fundamental personal rights - the state is not necessarily precluded from prohibiting the use of marijuana. The state is required, however, to show a compelling interest in order to sustain an infringement on
one of the fundamental constitutional rights. 1 49 In applying this principle
in Griswold v. Connecticut,'"0 the Court refused to follow the minimum
rationality standard which it had previously applied in cases where economic
interests were involved, 1 1 distinguishing cases involving fundamental
rights. 152 Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion in Griswold, stressed
that the state would have the burden of showing a compelling interest:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by
the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose.
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which
53
is compelling."'

145. 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968).
146. Id. at 2154.
147. Id.
148. See p. 853 supra.
149. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960). See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) ; NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
150. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
151. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Under the ninimum
rationality test, where a statute does not invade a constitutionally protected right, a
state need only show a reasonable relationship to its police power to justify the statute.

152.by 381
U.S. University
at 482. Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
Published
Villanova
153. Id. at 497, quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
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In addition to requiring a state to show a compelling interest in order
to invade a fundamental personal right, the Supreme Court has also required that the statute be drawn as narrowly as possible so as to minimize
the infringement on the protected freedoms." 4 Closely related to this
standard of "overbreadth" and the compelling interest test is the requirement that if a reasonable and adequate alternative exists which places
less of a burden on the protected right then it must be followed." 15 Thus,
in evaluating the constitutionality of a statute which prohibits the use and
possession of marijuana, it first must be established that the use of marijuana is protected by a fundamental constitutional right. The state then
must demonstrate a compelling interest in prohibiting the use and it must
establish that its objectives could not be reasonably met without a complete prohibition or by an alternate means of control.
In order to find a compelling state interest the alleged social harms
in the use of marijuana, discussed above, 150 must be evaluated. Because of
a lack of scientific evidence concerning the effects of marijuana use, 157 it
is quite difficult for a court to effectively evaluate these alleged harms. It
is interesting to note at this point how the California supreme court in
People v. Woody'"8 applied these tests in declaring unconstitutional the
California law prohibiting the use of peyote:
We have weighed the competing values represented in this case
on the symbolic scale of constitutionality. On the one side we have
placed the weight of freedom of religion as protected by the First
Amendment; on the other, the weight of the state's "compelling interest." Since the use of peyote incorporates the essence of the religious expression, the first weight is heavy. Yet the use of peyote
presents only slight danger to the state and to the enforcement of its

laws; the second weight is relatively light. The scale tips in favor of
the constitutional protection. 159

.In those cases which have examined the state interest in prohibiting

the use of marijuana, the courts, not having found a fundamental constitutional right protecting the use of marijuana, applied the reasonable relationship test. 16 0 Under this test, they held that the alleged harms of marijuana, though not supported by substantial evidence, were sufficient to meet
6
the requirement of reasonable relationship to the legislative purpose.' '
154. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,
307 (1964) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
155. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
156. See pp. 855-57 supra.
157. See p. 852 supra.
158. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
159. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
160. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted,
88 S. Ct. 2058 (1968) (No. 1365, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 65, 1968 Term);
65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 175 (1968) ; Common---- ,-People v. Aguiar- ..... Cal. App. 2d --

wealth v. Leis, Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5, at 6 (Suffolk Superior Ct., Mass.,
entered Dec. 1967) (findings, rulings and order on defendants' motions to dismiss).
161. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d at 861 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88
S. Ct. 2058 (1968) (No. 1365, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 65, 1968 Term) ; People
v. Aguiar, __. Cal. App. 2d ___ 65 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Leis, Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5, at 31 (Suffolk Superior Ct., Mass., entered Dec.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
1967) (findings, rulings and order on defendants' motions to dismiss).
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The Methods Used to Control Marijuana

Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments

While the holding in Robinson v. California'6 - may not present a bar
to any government prohibition of the use and possession of marijuana, it
may provide a very effective challenge to the excessive penalties currently
imposed for the use and possession of marijuana. 16 3 The application of
the eighth amendment bar against excessive punishment can be seen most
clearly in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Robinson where he stated
that "punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within
the ban against 'cruel and unusual punishment.' "164
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in Powell v. Texas,"' 5 also
recognized that the eighth amendment requires that the punishment fit
the crime when he stated:
The primary purpose of [the eighth amendment] has always been
considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of
punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes; the nature
of the conduct made criminal is ordinarily relevant only "to the fitness
of the punishment imposed."' 6
The first United States Supreme Court case in which the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruelly excessive punishments was sustained was Weems v. United States.16 7 In that case a 12-year sentence
of confinement at cadena temporal' 6s under Philippine law for falsifying
public records was held cruelly excessive.16 9 This approach was supported
by a comparison of Weems' sentence to those authorized in a number of
American jurisdictions for crimes that the Court considered at least equally
serious. It was said to be "a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense." 170 While the Weems
decision has been generally accepted by both federal and state courts as
establishing the rule that excessiveness as well as certain modes of punishment are unconstitutionally cruel, the rule has seldom been used to hold
harsh sentences invalid.'' The problem in applying the Weems principle
162. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

163. Under federal law possession of marijuana can bring a minimum mandatory
5-year prison sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964). The penalties for possession vary
greatly from state to state with the first offense usually punishable by a minimum
mandatory prison sentence of 2- to 5-years. For a complete summary of the penalties
under state law see W. ELDRIDGt, supra note 54, at 177-225.
164. 370 U.S. at 676.
165. 88 S.Ct. 2145 (1968).
166. Id. at 2154 (emphasis added).
167. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
168. "[T]hose sentenced to cadena temporal shall labor for the benefit of the
State." Id. at 381.
169. Id. at 380-81.
170. Id. at 367.
171. For a representative list of sentences that have been sustained against claims
of excessiveness and others that have been held cruel and unusual on such grounds
see byNote,
36 N.Y.U.L.
Published
Villanova
UniversityREv.
Charles
846Widger
(1961).School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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is establishing the standards for determining that a punishment is constitutionally excessive.
Possible considerations in determining unusually excessive punishments were suggested by Justice Goldberg in his dissent to a denial of
certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama172 when he asked: "Can the permissible
aims of punishment (e.g., deterrence, isolation, rehabilitation) be achieved
as effectively by punishing rape less severely than by death . . . ; if so,

does the imposition of the death penalty for rape constitute 'unnecessary
cruelty' ?"1173
In order to follow the reasoning suggested by Mr.Justice Goldberg
we must determine the state's objectives in imposing criminal sanctions.
It has been suggested in an extensive note discussing criminal sentencing 174
that the objectives of criminal sanctions are:
[1] rehabilitation of the convicted offender into a noncriminal member of society; [2] isolation of the offender from society to prevent
criminal conduct during the period of confinement; [3] deterrence of
other members of the community who might have tendencies toward
criminal conduct similar to those of the offender (secondary deterrence), and deterrence of the offender himself after release; [4]
community condnemnation or the reaffirmation of societal norms for
the purpose of maintaining respect for the norms themselves; and [5]
retribution or the satisfaction of the community's emotional desire to
punish the offender.1 75
An evaluation of the state's interest in relation to the objectives of
criminal punishment is quite similar to a discussion of "compelling state
interest" found above. 176 Here, however, we can evaluate the state's interests in relation to each of the specific objectives. Since the crimes of use
and possession of marijuana can be considered "crimes without victims"
many of the traditional objectives of the criminal law do not apply in
their usual sense. The concept of rehabilitation usually suggests the correction of the moral and or legal deficiencies considered responsible for
one's criminal activities. Thus, the question of rehabilitation is intimately
related to the individual's and society's moral attitude toward the smoking
of marijuana; for the individual who believes that the right to use marijuana is one of his fundamental constitutional rights or that it is protected by the freedom of religion, any attempts at rehabilitation, in the
commonly accepted sense, would be fruitless. Viewing rehabilitation in
the broad sense of preventing recidivism, however, it could be argued that
incarceration would serve the function of removing the marijuana user
from the drug using subculture with the hope that he would not return
to it after serving his sentence. This objective, however, based on the
172. 375 U.S. 889 (1963).

173. Id. at 891.
174. Note, 69 YALe L.J. 1453 (1960).
175. Id. at 1455.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
176. See pp. 859-60, 867-68 supra.
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tenuous possibility of rehabilitating through long periods of incarceration
hardly seems to be a reasonable justification for these sentences.
The objective of isolation would not apply in its usual sense either,
since there are no "victims" which we are concerned about protecting from
the marijuana user and thus the use of marijuana presents little direct
threat to society. Since marijuana users might introduce new people to
the use of marijuana, isolation of users could help to reduce the number
of people being introduced to marijuana. In order to justify the objective
of isolation on this basis, however, the state would have to establish some
significant relationship between current users and new users. Even if this
could be established, there does not appear to be a sufficient state interest
to justify the current penalties.
Deterrence is the usual objective associated with the marijuana laws.
The increasing state and federal penalties over the years1 77 are evidence
of legislative attempts to increase the deterrence factor. Statistics on marijuana violations and estimates on marijuana usage, 178 however, seem to
refute completely the existence of any added deterrent effect from the increase in the penalties. In an attempt to eliminate judicial leniency toward
marijuana users, the federal law and many state laws impose minimum
mandatory sentences for use and or possession of marijuana. 17 9 Recently,
however, the minimum mandatory sentence feature of the federal law has
been eliminated. 8 0° This, perhaps, is a legislative recognition of the ineffectiveness of such a penalty and the undesirable effect of precluding
judicial discretion in cases where it would clearly be warranted.
Certainty of apprehension and imposition of penalties would appear
to have a more forceful deterrent effect than the remote and uncertain
possibility of receiving a maximum sentence. When penalties become
severe and judicial discretion is removed, the only alternative for the
police, the district attorney, and the court in cases where they feel the
maximum sentence is not justified is to find the defendant not guilty or
not to arrest or indict him at all. This may help to explain the lack of
deterrent effect in the increased penalties for marijuana violations.
Perhaps one of the most significant, but unenunciated goals in punishing the use and possession of marijuana is community condemnation the reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintaining respect
'for the norms themselves. This concerns society's determination that the
smoking of marijuana is an undesirable and perhaps evil activity. In fact,
the very existence of the marijuana laws was more a result of the protestant
ethic l 's than a scientific determination of the harms stemming from marijuana use. Society has classified and condemned the use of marijuana as
177. See pp. 857-58 supra.
178. See p. 854 supra.
179. See W. ELDRIDGE, supra note 54, at 177-225.
180. Pub. L. No. 89-793, § 502, 80 Stat. 1449 (1966).
181. Murphy, supra note 5, at 21. See also Carstairs, Bhang and Alcohol: Cultural
Factors in the Choice of Intoxicants, in THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 66 (D. Solomon
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deviant behavior.' 82 One reason for the divergent treatment of alcohol
and marijuana was the difference in society's attitudes toward these two
intoxicants at the time the Marihuana Tax Act was passed in 1937;183
marijuana use at that time was confined to minority groups and the lower
classes, while the use of alcohol extended across the entire strata of
society. 8 4 The present marijuana laws, combined with the increasing
number of violations of these laws (i.e., increase in marijuana use),185 tend
to destroy one of the most basic norms of society - respect for the law.
Professor Hall, in discussing criminal sentencing, 186 has suggested
that crimes against the person are punished in such a manner as will most
nearly satisfy the emotional reactions of the community to the crime the retribution objective. Crimes solely against property involving more
than a slight amount are punished in such a manner as will, primarily,
guard against repetition by the defendant; crimes against property where
personal injury is involved are also punished on an emotional basis.
In crimes which do not involve the person or property, i.e., "crimes without victims," such as the use and possession of marijuana, the deterrent
element becomes far more important than retribution. The deterrence goal
of the criminal law is, in fact, limited by the theory of retribution, for without such limitation life sentences would be imposed in cases where there
was no possibility of reformation. Certainly then, the severe marijuana
penalties cannot be justified on a basis of retribution where, as with other
crimes which do not involve the person or property, marijuana use creates
little emotional desire for punishment.
After evaluating the five objectives of criminal sanctions we find that
the only two which have any significant relevance to the marijuana laws
are deterrence and community condemnation. It appears difficult to justify
severe penalties on a basis of a deterrent objective in the light of the
empirical evidence refuting the deterrent effect.' 8 7 Also, since we are weighing the state's interest in the achievement of these objectives to justify
the punishment imposed, it is highly questionable whether the arbitrary
mores of society are sufficient to justify the severe penalties.
Any judicial determination that the penalties for marijuana use or
possession are constitutionally excessive must take into consideration all
of the limited scientific evidence currently available on the harms in the
use of marijuana. Courts have been highly reluctant to involve themselves
in such investigation. 88 In the one court where an intensive investigation
was conducted, the court concluded that even on the basis of the limited
scientific evidence available, there was sufficient harm to justify the im182. Becker, supra note 11, at 46.

183. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 21.

184. Id.; see p. 853 supra.
185. See p. 854 supra.
186. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUM. L. Rpv. 521
(1937).

187. See p. 871 supra.

188. E.g., Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted,
No. 65, 1968 Term) ; State

88 S. Ct. 2058 (1968) (No. 1365,1967 Term; renumbered
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
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873

position of these penalties.'8 9 However, it is questionable whether the
severe penalties should remain until these harms can be substantiated in fact.
2.

Equal Protection

As discussed above, there is a constitutional requirement that the
state show a compelling interest in prohibiting the use of marijuana if a
fundamental right to use marijuana is found to exist. Even if no fundamental right protecting the use of marijuana is found to exist, the state
must still demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the prohibition
of marijuana and a legitimate state interest under its police power. In
addition, there is also the constitutional guarantee of equal protection,
provided by the fourteenth amendment,19 0 which requires that a criminal
statute cover all persons whose inclusion is necessary, logically, scientifically, or by reason of common sense, to effectuate the legitimate objectives
of the statute.' 91
In one of the leading cases applying the equal protection
clause the
United States Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma'9 2 declared unconstitutional a state statute which required sterilization of persons convicted
two or more times of a felony involving moral turpitude, since the statute
included chicken stealing within the list of felonies involving moral turpitude while embezzlement was not included. The Court reasoned that
"[wihen the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense . . . it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for
oppressive treatment."''
This aspect of equal protection could provide
an argument that the failure to include alcohol within the class of prohibited euphorics violates the fourteenth amendment. Under Skinner it
would appear that the state has the burden of justifying the diverse treatment of alcohol and marijuana since even the limited scientific evidence
available today seems to indicate the harms produced by marijuana and
alcohol are quite similar.194 This aspect of equal protection does not challenge the state's basic right to prohibit marijuana but only attacks the
method of control - prohibiting marijuana while merely regulating alcohol.
189. Commonwealth v. Leis, Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5 (Suffolk Superior
Ct., Mass., entered Dec. 1967) (findings, rulings and order on defendants' motions
to dismiss).
The American Medical Association and the Committee on Problems of Drug
Dependence of the National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, in a
recent statement on marijuana, concluded that the penalties for violations of the marijuana laws are often harsh and unrealistic. Marihuana and Society, 204 J.A.M.A.
1181 (1968).
190. The fourteenth amendment states inpart: "No State shall . . .deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
191. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942). See generally Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rv. 341 (1949).
192. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
193. Id. at 541.
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Another aspect of the equal protection guarantee was expressed by
the Supreme Court in McLaughlin v. Florida.195 In declaring unconstitutional a statutory prohibition of cohabitation between members of different
races, the Court held that "courts must reach and determine the question
whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its
...190 Under McLaughlin a court must look to the purpose of
purpose.
a criminal statute in order to ascertain whether the classification is reasonable in light of this purpose. The reasoning in McLaughlin raises the
question of the constitutionality of grouping marijuana with "hard narcotics" as under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. 197 The reason usually
given for including marijuana with the "hard narcotics" is that marijuana
is closely related to the narcotic and crime problems.'09 Whether the
actual relationship between marijuana and the narcotic and crime problems
is sufficient to satisfy the equal protection requirements as enunciated in
McLaughlin is highly questionable in light of the present knowledge of
marijuana, limited as it may be. 199 In order to apply the McLaughlin
test, a court would have to investigate fully the legislative purposes behind
the marijuana laws and the current scientific and sociological information
on marijuana - a task most courts have refused to undertake in the past.2 0
2° 1
attempted to justify the
Judge Tauro, in Commonwealth v. Leis,

diverse treatment of alcohol and marijuana by claiming that, on the basis
of what he considered prevailing patterns of the use of the two drugs, it
was fair to characterize marijuana as an intoxicant and alcohol merely as
a potential intoxicant. 20 2 This conclusion does not appear to be completely
justified in the light of the conclusions of the LaGuardia Report and of
more recent surveys and studies of the use of marijuana which indicate that
the patterns of use are similar. 20 3 In answering the equal protection argument raised as a challenge to the California marijuana laws, the California
supreme court in People v. Aguiar204 held that "in light of present medical
attitudes towards marijuana, we cannot say that the proscription against
the possession of marijuana is palpably arbitrary and erroneous beyond
rational doubt."205 It could be argued, however, that Skinner requires
195. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
196. Id. at 191.
197. Section 1 of the Act includes, in addition to marijuana, opium, heroin, and
morphine. UNIVORM NARCOTIcs DRUG Ac'T § 1.
198. See United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914, 919 (S.D. Cal. 1957)
People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 64, 400 P.2d 923, 927 (1965).
199. See pp. 855-56 supra.
200. See United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957) ; People
v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965). But see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
201. Nos. 28841-2, 28844-5, 28864-5 (Suffolk Superior Ct., Mass., entered Dec.
1967) (findings, rulings and order on defendants' motions to dismiss).
202. Id. at 19.
203. See pp. 852-54 supra.
65 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968).
204 -.... Cal. App. 2d ..
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
205. Id. at ---- 65 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
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that the state show more than just some reason for discriminating between
what is "intrinsically the same quality of offense." 20 6
3.

Federal Marijuana Laws and Self-incrimination

Another constitutional challenge arises with respect to the manner in
which marijuana possession is regulated under federal law - through
registration and taxing statutes. 20 7 Under the Marihuana Tax Act transferors and transferees of marijuana must register with the government,
20 8
obtain order forms from the government, and pay a transfer tax.

Recently, the Supreme Court in three separate cases reversed convictions
of persons charged with violating the wagering tax 2 9 and firearm registration provisions 210 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court held: (1)
that the requirement that gamblers register and pay the occupational tax
created substantial risks of self-incrimination by significantly enhancing
the likelihood of criminal prosecutions under federal and state laws and,
consequently, the fifth amendment can provide a defense to a criminal
charge of noncompliance with those requirements ;211 (2) that the requirement that gamblers file special reports as a condition to payment of the
tax leads to production of readily incriminating evidence, and, therefore,
the fifth amendment precludes criminal conviction for failure to pay the
tax;212 and (3) the fifth amendment can provide a defense to prosecutions
either for failure to register or for possession of an unregistered firearm
since the effect of such provisions is to require an admission of un213
lawful possession.
The application of the reasoning in these cases to the Marihuana Tax
Act will be decided by the Supreme Court in the near future since the
Court has granted certiorari in the case of Leary v. United States214 and
limited its consideration to the questions of:
[1] Whether the registration and tax provisions in 26 U.S.C.
Sections 4741(a), 4742 and 4744(a), as applied to Petitioner, violate
his privilege against self incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights thereunder as
amplified by this Court in three recently decided cases: Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ;
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906
(1968) ; and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S. Ct. 722, 19
L.Ed.2d 923 (1968).
206. See Boyko & Rotberg, Constitutional Objections to California's Aarijuaia
Possession Statute, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 773 (1967).
207. 26 U.S.C. § 4741-62 (1964).
208. 26 U.S.C. § 4741-62 (1964).
209. INT. RmV. CoDE of 1954, §§ 4401-23.
210.

INT.

REv. CooE of 1954, § 5851.

211. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
212. Grosso v.United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
213. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
214. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd on rehearing, 392 F.2d 220, cert. granted,
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[2] Whether Petitioner was denied due process under the Fifth
Amendment by the application, under the circumstances of this case,
of the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 176a, providing that an inference
may be drawn respecting the illegal
origin and nature of marihuana
215
solely from possession thereof.
Even if the Supreme Court finds that the fifth amendment provides a
valid defense for prosecutions for violation of the federal marijuana laws,
as the cases seem to indicate they should, 210 the federal government could
easily regulate the possession of marijuana under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 217 as it does LSD. 215

Congress enacted the Food, Drug

and Cosmetic Act under the Commerce Clause2 19 and the Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 220 In the 1965 amendments to
the Act, Congress made criminal the sale or possession of certain dangerous drugs without regard to whether they have crossed state lines or
international boundaries. 221 The power of the federal government to control LSD under this act, without the requirement of the drug crossing state
215. 88 S. Ct. 2058.

216. See 13 VILL. L. Rev. 650, 655-56 (1968).
217. 21 U.S.C. § 331(q) (2) (Supp. II, 1967) prohibits:
(2) the sale, delivery, or other disposition of a drug in violation of Section
360a(b) of this title; (3) the possession of a drug in violation of Section 360a(c)
of this title.
21 U.S.C. § 360a(b) (Supp. II, 1967) provides:
No person . . . shall sell, deliver, or otherwise dispose of any depressant or
stimulant drug to any other person.
21 U.S.C. § 360a(c) (Supp. II, 1967) provides:
No person . . . shall possess any depressant or stimulant drug otherwise than
(1) for the personal use of himself or a member of his household, or (2) for
administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his household. In any
criminal prosecution for possession of a depressant or stimulant drug in violation
of this subsection (which is made a prohibited act by Section 331(q) (3) of this
title), the United States shall have the burden of proof that the possession involved does not come within the exceptions contained in clauses (1) and (2) of
the preceding sentence.
"Depressant or stimulant drug" is defined in § 321(v) as follows:
(1) any drug which contains any quantity of (A) barbituric acid or any
of the salts of barbituric acid; or (B) any derivative of barbituric acid which has
been designated by the Secretary under Section 352(d) of this title as habit
forming;
(2) any drug which contains any quantity of (A) amphetamine or any of its
optical isomers; (B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of
amphetamine; or (C) any substance which the Secretary, after investigation, has
found to be, and by regulation designated as, habit forming because of its stimulant
effect on the central nervous system; or
(3) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Secretary, after investigation, has found to have, and by regulation designates as having,
a potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central
nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect; except that the Secretary shall
not designate under this paragraph, or under clause (C) of subparagraph (2), any
substance that is now included, or is hereafter included, within the classifications
stated in Section 4731, and marihuana as defined in Section 4761 of Title 26.
218. By regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 166.3, the Federal Food and Drug Commissioner
has designated all drugs containing any amount of LSD-25 as having a potential
for abuse because of their hallucinogenic effect.
219. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, clause 3, provides in part: "[The Congress shall have
power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian Tribes."
220. United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
221. 21 U.S.C. § 360 (Supp. II, 1967).
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lines was recently upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 222 While the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act specifically does not cover marijuana, 223 there is no
reason why it could not be so extended, especially if the Supreme Court
were to hold the Marihuana Tax Act unconstitutional or unenforceable.
V.

CONCLUSION

Of all the potential constitutional challenges to the laws against the
use and possession of marijuana, the freedom of religion argument would
provide the greatest problem in its application and have the most farreaching repercussions in other areas of the law. By deciding that the
use of marijuana is protected by the freedom of religion, as urged in Leary
v. United States, 224 the Supreme Court would be expanding the present
concept of religion. Even though the Court has already held that it is not
necessary to belong to an organized church or believe in a supreme being
to justify application of the guarantee of freedom of religion, including
the use of psychedelic drugs within this first amendment guarantee would
be a significant change from its traditional import. If the Court were to
hold that the use of marijuana for religious purposes is protected by the
first amendment, such a holding would not preclude any marijuana laws,
but it would require that an exception be made for religious use. This
would undoubtedly open the door to a flood of cases in which the freedom
of religion protection would be advanced and would require courts to
define the limits of legitimate religious use.
The right of privacy, as enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut,225
does not appear to provide a strong argument for a substantive bar to all
marijuana laws. However, the problems of the enforcement of these laws,
as in all similar laws not involving victims, may be a strong argument
for their limitation legislatively, if not judicially. Under the expanding
concepts of the right of privacy, the considerations involved in the enforcement of the law may provide sufficient justification for holding these
laws unconstitutional.
Closely related to the claims of freedom of religion and the right of
privacy is the other constitutional concept enunciated in Griswold fundamental personal rights. This expanding concept refutes the traditional notion that the Constitution does not protect one's right to participate in activities purely for their personal gratification or pleasure. Since
the right of privacy and the fundamental personal rights have only been
applied by the Supreme Court to those activities related to specific first
amendment guarantees or considered "essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness" it does not seem likely that the Court will extend these protections to marijuana despite the strong arguments that can be made in
favor of such an extension.
222. Deyo v. United
States, No. 22,058 (9th Cir., filed June 5, 1968).
223. 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(v)(3)(c) (Supp. II, 1967).
224. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd on rehearing, 392 F.2d 220, cert. granted,
88 S. Ct. 2058 (1968)
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The concept of substantive due process, particularly as enunciated in
Robinson v. California,226 would not seem to present much of an obstacle
to the prohibition of marijuana. The question presented by the substantive
due process requirement - is this the type of conduct for which criminal
sanctions can be imposed? - could easily be answered in the affirmative
under our present standards of constitutionality and morality. The issue of
substantive due process is only raised, however, if marijuana use is not
protected by one of the fundamental constitutional rights discussed above.
Any of the constitutional objections to the marijuana laws requires
the determination of the state's compelling interest as balanced against the
constitutional protection. If any of these constitutional guarantees could
be sustained, it appears that on the basis of the present scientific evidence
the state would not be able to meet its burden of showing a compelling
interest in outlawing the possession and use of marijuana. This would
necessitate an evaluation by the courts of this scientific evidence, a most
complex task which they have been unwilling to undertake in the past.2 2 7
Of all the constitutional objections to the marijuana laws the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment may provide the greatest chance for success. In holding penalties for use and
possession of marijuana constitutionally excessive in violation of the eighth
amendment, the Court would not be precluding any prohibitions against
the use and possession of marijuana, but merely declaring that present
penalties are constitutionally excessive. While the courts have been reluctant to second-guess the legislatures in their determination of sentences,
the failure of the legislatures to act in light of the scientific evidence
surrounding the harms of the use of marijuana may provide sufficient
justification for the courts to step in at this time. It should also provide
a middle-of-the-road approach - not legalizing the use of marijuana but
bringing the penalties more in line with those of similar crimes. The
judicial declaration that the present penalties are constitutionally excessive
may provide the needed impetus to the legislatures to completely reevaluate
the present prohibitions against marijuana use and possession.
The equal protection guarantee would probably not be successful in
barring marijuana laws since even under the tests presented in Skinner
v. Oklahoma228 and McLaughlin v. Florida229 there are arguable justifications for distinguishing marijuana from alcohol and grouping it with the
"hard narcotics."
Constitutionality is not the only question involved in a rational
approach to drug control, as the Prohibition Era so vividly demonstrated.
Among students and certain other groups, the marijuana laws are increasingly being regarded with a kind of disrespect that followed the
226. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

227. See Oteri & Norris, The Use of Evidence in a Constitutional Attack on a
State Criminal Statute, 29 CALW. L. Riv. 29 (1968).
228. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss4/11
229. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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prohibition of alcohol. In rationally examining the consequences of legal
suppression as a method of drug control, we should consider (1) the consequences of unrestricted use or nonpunitive controls; (2) whether the
laws are enforceable; (3) whether the prescribed punishment is commensurate with the offense - whether it is consistent with that imposed
for other offenses; and (4) the value of deterrence versus the laws' unintended consequences. It is clear that the present methods of controlling
marijuana require substantial revision and that further research into the
effects of its use is necessary. The failure of legislatures to act in these
respects may precipitate judicial action, particularly in light of the significant constitutional issues involved.
Mark S. Dichter
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